

Introduction to Modern Cryptography



8th lecture:

Private-Key Management and the
Public-Key Revolution

Outline of the Course

	secret key	public key
confidentiality	private-key encryption	public-key encryption
authentication	message authentication codes (MAC)	digital signatures

Outline of the Course

- reduction proofs
- pseudorandomness
- block ciphers: DES, AES

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- collision-resistant hash functions

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
- algorithmic number theory
- key distribution, Diffie-Hellmann
- RSA

- reduction proofs
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
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Key Management: Pairwise Keys




- each of the N users needs to store $N-1$ keys
- updating is annoying
- open systems are impossible

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
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Key Distribution Center (KDC)




- Mac_{k_A} (“I want to talk to Bob”)
- session key $k \leftarrow \text{KDC}$,
sends $\text{EncMac}_{k_A}(k)$ to Alice and $\text{EncMac}_{k_B}(k)$ to Bob
- or sends $\text{EncMac}_{k_A}(k, \text{EncMac}_{k_B}(k))$ to Alice

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Key Distribution Center (KDC)



- users have to store only one key
- update only one key
- **single point of failure / single point of attack**

Whitfield Diffie

*1944



- BSc from MIT
- honorary PhD from ETH Zurich
- working at Sun

Martin Edward Hellman

*1945



- IBM Watson
- MIT, Stanford
- NuclearRisk.org