Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Exercise # 6

University of Amsterdam, Master of Logic
Lecturer: Christian Schaffner
TA: Joachim Schipper

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1. **One-time MAC:** Let us consider the following message authentication code:

   $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$**:** Let $p = \text{NextPrime}(2^n)$; pick $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ (so $a \in \{1, 2, \ldots, p-1\}$, $b \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, p-1\}$.) Output p, a, b.

   $\mathsf{Mac}_{p,a,b}(m)$**:** Output $[am + b \mod p]$.

   $\mathsf{Vrfy}_{p,a,b}(m, t)$**:** Output 1 if $\mathsf{Mac}_{p,a,b}(m) = t$, output 0 otherwise.

   Note that this MAC handles messages $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ (only).

   Show that the above MAC is secure against any adversary making at most one query (see Definition 4.2 in [KL]). In particular, show that this MAC is secure even if the adversary is *not* restricted to run in polynomial time.

2. **Pre-image resistance of hash functions:** Exercise 4.10 of [KL].

3. **Double-hash:** Exercise 4.12 in [KL]. **Hint:** Yes.

4. **Another exercise in formal reduction proofs:** Exercise 4.13 in [KL]. **Tip:** You are *not* required to reprove statements that are already derived in the proof of Theorem 4.14 in the book. You *are* asked to write down (as precisely as you can) the formal reduction, for example, specify exactly what the adversary against h does.

5. **A dangerous idea:** Exercise 4.17 of [KL]. **Hint:** Use $\mathsf{Mac}_k(m)$ to construct a valid tag on a particular longer message $\mathsf{Mac}_k(m')$. Note that Merkle-Damgård appends the length of the message to the end of the input string, you'll need to figure out how to get around that.



The Merkle-Damgård construction
Image credit: `David Göthberg, wikimedia.org` .