Assignment 5
Consider the decision problem studied in Example 23 (Taking an efficient decision) on page 99. Note that the decision function is efficient so we can use the pivotal mechanism.

Suppose that there are three players, A, B and C, and two decisions, $d_{1}$ and $d_{2}$. Assume the following situation:

| decision | value <br> for A | value <br> for B | value <br> for C |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $d_{1}$ | 10 | 19 | 30 |
| $d_{2}$ | 15 | 11 | 40 |

where by "value" we mean the "satisfaction level". Assume that all three players submit truthfully their types. What taxes will they pay according to the pivotal mechanism?

