

Algorithmic Information Theory

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Abstract

We introduce *algorithmic information theory*, also known as the theory of *Kolmogorov complexity*. We explain the main concepts of this quantitative approach to defining ‘information’. We discuss the extent to which Kolmogorov’s and Shannon’s information theory have a common purpose, and where they are fundamentally different. We indicate how recent developments within the theory allow one to formally distinguish between ‘*structural*’ (*meaningful*) and ‘*random*’ information as measured by the *Kolmogorov structure function*, which leads to a mathematical formalization of Occam’s razor in inductive inference. We end by discussing some of the philosophical implications of the theory.

Keywords Kolmogorov complexity, algorithmic information theory, Shannon information theory, mutual information, data compression, Kolmogorov structure function, Minimum Description Length Principle.

1 Introduction

How should we measure the amount of information about a phenomenon that is given to us by an observation concerning the phenomenon? Both ‘classical’ (Shannon) information theory (see the chapter by Harremoës and Topsøe [2007]) and algorithmic information theory start with the idea that this amount can be measured by *the minimum number of bits needed to describe the observation*. But whereas Shannon’s theory considers description methods that are optimal relative to some given probability distribution, Kolmogorov’s algorithmic theory takes a different, nonprobabilistic approach: any computer program that first computes (prints) the string representing the observation, and then terminates, is viewed as a valid description. The amount of information in the string is then defined as the size (measured in bits) of the *shortest* computer program that outputs the string and then terminates. A similar definition can be given

for infinite strings, but in this case the program produces element after element forever. Thus, a long sequence of 1's such as

$$\overbrace{11\dots 1}^{10000 \text{ times}} \tag{1}$$

contains little information because a program of size about $\log 10000$ bits outputs it:

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for i := 1 to 10000 ; print 1.
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Likewise, the transcendental number $\pi = 3.1415\dots$, an infinite sequence of seemingly ‘random’ decimal digits, contains but a few bits of information (There is a short program that produces the consecutive digits of π forever).

Such a definition would appear to make the amount of information in a string (or other object) depend on the particular programming language used. Fortunately, it can be shown that all reasonable choices of programming languages lead to quantification of the amount of ‘absolute’ information in individual objects that is invariant up to an additive constant. We call this quantity the ‘Kolmogorov complexity’ of the object. While regular strings have small Kolmogorov complexity, random strings have Kolmogorov complexity about equal to their own length. Measuring complexity and information in terms of program size has turned out to be a very powerful idea with applications in areas such as theoretical computer science, logic, probability theory, statistics and physics.

This Chapter Kolmogorov complexity was introduced independently and with different motivations by R.J. Solomonoff (born 1926), A.N. Kolmogorov (1903–1987) and G. Chaitin (born 1943) in 1960/1964, 1965 and 1966 respectively [Solomonoff 1964; Kolmogorov 1965; Chaitin 1966]. During the last forty years, the subject has developed into a major and mature area of research. Here, we give a brief overview of the subject geared towards an audience specifically interested in the philosophy of information. With the exception of the recent work on the Kolmogorov structure function and parts of the discussion on philosophical implications, all material we discuss here can also be found in the standard textbook [Li and Vitányi 1997]. The chapter is structured as follows: we start with an introductory section in which we define Kolmogorov complexity and list its most important properties. We do this in a much simplified (yet formally correct) manner, avoiding both technicalities and all questions of motivation (why this definition and not another one?). This is followed by Section 3 which provides an informal overview of the more technical topics discussed later in this chapter, in Sections 4– 6. The final Section 7, which discusses the theory’s philosophical implications, as well as Section 6.3, which discusses the connection to inductive inference, are less technical again, and should perhaps be glossed over before delving into the technicalities of Sections 4– 6.

2 Kolmogorov Complexity: Essentials

The aim of this section is to introduce our main notion in the fastest and simplest possible manner, avoiding, to the extent that this is possible, all technical and motivational issues. Section 2.1 provides a simple definition of Kolmogorov complexity. We list some of its key properties in Section 2.2. Knowledge of these key properties is an essential prerequisite for understanding the advanced topics treated in later sections.

2.1 Definition

The Kolmogorov complexity K will be defined as a function from finite binary strings of arbitrary length to the natural numbers \mathbb{N} . Thus, $K : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is a function defined on ‘objects’ represented by binary strings. Later the definition will be extended to other types of objects such as numbers (Example 3), sets, functions and probability distributions (Example 7).

As a first approximation, $K(x)$ may be thought of as the length of the shortest computer program that prints x and then halts. This computer program may be written in Fortran, Java, LISP or any other *universal programming language*. By this we mean a general-purpose programming language in which a universal Turing Machine can be implemented. Most languages encountered in practice have this property. For concreteness, let us fix some universal language (say, LISP) and define Kolmogorov complexity with respect to it. The *invariance theorem* discussed below implies that it does not really matter which one we pick. Computer programs often make use of data. Such data are sometimes listed inside the program. An example is the bitstring "010110..." in the program

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print"01011010101000110...010" (2)
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In other cases, such data are given as additional input to the program. To prepare for later extensions such as conditional Kolmogorov complexity, we should allow for this possibility as well. We thus extend our initial definition of Kolmogorov complexity by considering computer programs with a very simple input-output interface: programs are provided a stream of bits, which, while running, they can read one bit at a time. There are no end-markers in the bit stream, so that, if a program p halts on input y and outputs x , then it will also halt on any input yz , where z is a continuation of y , and still output x . We write $p(y) = x$ if, on input y , p prints x and then halts. We define the Kolmogorov complexity relative to a given language as the length of the shortest program p plus input y , such that, when given input y , p computes (outputs) x and then halts. Thus:

$$K(x) := \min_{y,p:p(y)=x} l(p) + l(y), \quad (3)$$

where $l(p)$ denotes the length of input p , and $l(y)$ denotes the length of program y , both expressed in bits. To make this definition formally entirely correct, we need to assume that the program P runs on a computer with unlimited memory, and that the

language in use has access to all this memory. Thus, while the definition (3) can be made formally correct, it does obscure some technical details which need not concern us now. We return to these in Section 4.

2.2 Key Properties of Kolmogorov Complexity

To gain further intuition about $K(x)$, we now list five of its key properties. Three of these concern the size of $K(x)$ for commonly encountered types of strings. The fourth is the invariance theorem, and the fifth is the fact that $K(x)$ is uncomputable in general. Henceforth, we use x to denote finite bitstrings. We abbreviate $l(x)$, the length of a given bitstring x , to n . We use boldface \mathbf{x} to denote an infinite binary string. In that case, $x_{[1:n]}$ is used to denote the initial n -bit segment of \mathbf{x} .

1(a). Very Simple Objects: $K(x) = O(\log n)$. $K(x)$ must be small for ‘simple’ or ‘regular’ objects x . For example, there exists a fixed-size program that, when input n , outputs the first n bits of π and then halts. As is easy to see (Section 4.2), specification of n takes $O(\log n)$ bits. Thus, when x consists of the first n bits of π , its complexity is $O(\log n)$. Similarly, we have $K(x) = O(\log n)$ if x represents the first n bits of a sequence like (1) consisting of only 1s. We also have $K(x) = O(\log n)$ for the first n bits of e , written in binary; or even for the first n bits of a sequence whose i -th bit is the i -th bit of $e^{2.3}$ if the $i - 1$ -st bit was a one, and the i -th bit of $1/\pi$ if the $i - 1$ -st bit was a zero. For certain ‘special’ lengths n , we may have $K(x)$ even substantially smaller than $O(\log n)$. For example, suppose $n = 2^m$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$. Then we can describe n by first describing m and then describing a program implementing the function $f(z) = 2^z$. The description of m takes $O(\log m)$ bits, the description of the program takes a constant number of bits not depending on n . Therefore, for such values of n , we get $K(x) = O(\log m) = O(\log \log n)$.

1(b). Completely Random Objects: $K(x) = n + O(\log n)$. A *code* or *description method* is a binary relation between source words – strings to be encoded – and code words – encoded versions of these strings. Without loss of generality, we can take the set of code words to be finite binary strings [Cover and Thomas 1991]. In this chapter we only consider *uniquely decodable* codes where the relation is one-to-one or one-to-many, indicating that given an encoding $E(x)$ of string x , we can always reconstruct the original x . The Kolmogorov complexity of x can be viewed as the code length of x that results from using the *Kolmogorov code* $E^*(x)$: this is the code that encodes x by the shortest program that prints x and halts.

The following crucial insight will be applied to the Kolmogorov code, but it is important to realize that in fact it holds for *every* uniquely decodable code. For any uniquely decodable code, there are no more than 2^m strings x which can be described by m bits. The reason is quite simply that there are no more than 2^m binary strings of length m . Thus, the number of strings that can be described by less than m bits can be at most $2^{m-1} + 2^{m-2} + \dots + 1 < 2^m$. In particular, this holds for the code E^* whose

length function is $K(x)$. Thus, the fraction of strings x of length n with $K(x) < n - k$ is less than 2^{-k} : the overwhelming majority of sequences cannot be compressed by more than a constant. Specifically, if x is determined by n independent tosses of a fair coin, then all sequences of length n have the same probability 2^{-n} , so that with probability at least $1 - 2^{-k}$,

$$K(x) \geq n - k.$$

On the other hand, for arbitrary x , there exists a program ‘`print x; halt`’. This program seems to have length $n + O(1)$ where $O(1)$ is a small constant, accounting for the ‘print’ and ‘halt’ symbols. We have to be careful though: computer programs are usually represented as a sequence of bytes. Then in the program above x cannot be an arbitrary sequence of bytes, because we somehow have to mark the end of x . Although we represent both the program and the string x as bits rather than bytes, the same problem remains. To avoid it, we have to encode x in a prefix-free manner (Section 4.2) which takes $n + O(\log n)$ bits, rather than $n + O(1)$. Therefore, for all x of length n , $K(x) \leq n + O(\log n)$. Except for a fraction of 2^{-c} of these, $K(x) \geq n - c$ so that for the overwhelming majority of x ,

$$K(x) = n + O(\log n). \tag{4}$$

Similarly, if x is determined by independent tosses of a fair coin, then (4) holds with overwhelming probability. Thus, while for very regular strings, the Kolmogorov complexity is small (sublinear in the length of the string), *most* strings have Kolmogorov complexity about equal to their own length. Such strings are called (*Kolmogorov*) *random*: they do not exhibit any discernible pattern. A more precise definition follows in Example 4.

1(c). Stochastic Objects: $K(x) = \alpha n + o(n)$. Suppose $\mathbf{x} = x_1 x_2 \dots$ where the individual x_i are realizations of some random variable X_i , distributed according to some distribution P . For example, we may have that all outcomes X_1, X_2, \dots are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) with for all i , $P(X_i = 1) = p$ for some $p \in [0, 1]$. In that case, as will be seen in Section 5.3, Theorem 10,

$$K(x_{[1:n]}) = n \cdot H(p) + o(n), \tag{5}$$

where \log is logarithm to the base 2, and $H(p) = -p \log p - (1 - p) \log(1 - p)$ is the binary entropy, defined in Section 5.1. For now the important thing to note is that $0 \leq H(p) \leq 1$, with $H(p)$ achieving its maximum 1 for $p = 1/2$. Thus, if data are generated by independent tosses of a fair coin, (5) is consistent with (4). If data are generated by a biased coin, then the Kolmogorov complexity will still increase linearly in n , but with a factor less than 1 in front: the data can be compressed by a linear amount. This still holds if the data are distributed according to some P under which the different outcomes are dependent, as long as this P is ‘nondegenerate’.¹ An example

¹This means that there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ such that, for all $n \geq 0$, all $x^n \in \{0, 1\}^n$, for $a \in \{0, 1\}$, $P(x_{n+1} = a \mid x_1, \dots, x_n) > \epsilon$.

is a k -th order Markov chain, where the probability of the i -th bit being a 1 depends on the value of the previous k bits, but nothing else. If none of the 2^k probabilities needed to specify such a chain are either 0 or 1, then the chain will be ‘nondegenerate’ in our sense, implying that, with P -probability 1, $K(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ grows linearly in n .

2. Invariance It would seem that $K(x)$ depends strongly on what programming language we used in our definition of K . However, it turns out that, for any two universal languages L_1 and L_2 , letting K_1 and K_2 denote the respective complexities, for all x of each length,

$$|K_1(x) - K_2(x)| \leq C, \tag{6}$$

where C is a constant that depends on L_1 and L_2 but not on x or its length. Since we allow *any* universal language in the definition of K , $K(x)$ is only defined up to an additive constant. This means that the theory is inherently *asymptotic*: it can make meaningful statements pertaining to strings of increasing length, such as $K(x_{[1:n]}) = f(n) + O(1)$ in the three examples 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) above. A statement such as $K(a) = b$ is not very meaningful.

It is actually very easy to show (6). It is known from the theory of computation that for any two universal languages L_1 and L_2 , there exists a compiler, written in L_1 , translating programs written in L_2 into equivalent programs written in L_1 . Thus, let L_1 and L_2 be two universal languages, and let Λ be a program in L_1 implementing a compiler translating from L_2 to L_1 . For concreteness, assume L_1 is LISP and L_2 is Java. Let (p, y) be the shortest combination of Java program plus input that prints a given string x . Then the LISP program Λ , when given input p followed by y , will also print x and halt.² It follows that $K_{\text{LISP}}(x) \leq l(\Lambda) + l(p) + l(y) \leq K_{\text{Java}}(x) + O(1)$, where $O(1)$ is the size of Λ . By symmetry, we also obtain the opposite inequality. Repeating the argument for general universal L_1 and L_2 , (6) follows.

3. Uncomputability Unfortunately $K(x)$ is not a recursive function: the Kolmogorov complexity is not computable in general. This means that there exists no computer program that, when input an arbitrary string, outputs the Kolmogorov complexity of that string and then halts. We prove this fact in Section 4, Example 3. Kolmogorov complexity can be computably approximated (technically speaking, it is *upper semicomputable* [Li and Vitányi 1997]), but not in a practically useful way: while the approximating algorithm with input x successively outputs better and better approximations $t_1 \geq t_2 \geq t_3 \geq \dots$ to $K(x)$, it is (a) excessively slow, and (b), it is in general impossible to determine whether the current approximation t_i is already a good one or not. In the words of Barron and Cover [1991], (eventually) “You know, but you do not know you know”.

Do these properties make the theory irrelevant for practical applications? Certainly not. The reason is that it is possible to approximate Kolmogorov complexity after all,

²To formalize this argument we need to setup the compiler in a way such that p and y can be fed to the compiler without any symbols in between, but this can be done; see Example 2.

in the following, weaker sense: we take some existing data compression program C (for example, gzip) that allows every string x to be encoded and decoded computably and even efficiently. We then approximate $K(x)$ as the number of bits it takes to encode x using compressor C . For many compressors, one can show that for “most” strings x in the set of all strings of interest, $C(x) \approx K(x)$. Both *universal coding* [Cover and Thomas 1991] and the *Minimum Description Length (MDL) Principle* (Section 6.3) are, to some extent, based on such ideas. Universal coding forms the basis of most practical lossless data compression algorithms, and MDL is a practically successful method for statistical inference. There is an even closer connection to the *normalized compression distance* method, a practical tool for data similarity analysis that can explicitly be understood as an approximation of an “ideal” but uncomputable method based on Kolmogorov complexity [Cilibrasi and Vitányi 2005].

3 Overview and Summary

Now that we introduced our main concept, we are ready to give a summary of the remainder of the chapter.

Section 4: Kolmogorov Complexity – Details We motivate our definition of Kolmogorov complexity in terms of the theory of computation: the Church–Turing thesis implies that our choice of description method, based on universal computers, is essentially the only reasonable one. We then introduce some basic coding theoretic concepts, most notably the so-called *prefix-free codes* that form the basis for our version of Kolmogorov complexity. Based on these notions, we give a precise definition of Kolmogorov complexity and we fill in some details that were left open in the introduction.

Section 5: Shannon vs. Kolmogorov Here we outline the similarities and differences in aim and scope of Shannon’s and Kolmogorov’s information theories. Section 5.1 reviews the *entropy*, the central concept in Shannon’s theory. Although their primary aim is quite different, and they are functions defined on different spaces, there is a close relation between entropy and Kolmogorov complexity (Section 5.3): if data are distributed according to some computable distribution then, roughly, *entropy is expected Kolmogorov complexity*.

Entropy and Kolmogorov complexity are concerned with information in a single object: a random variable (Shannon) or an individual sequence (Kolmogorov). Both theories provide a (distinct) notion of *mutual information* that measures the information that *one object gives about another object*. We introduce and compare the two notions in Section 5.4.

Entropy, Kolmogorov complexity and mutual information are concerned with *lossless* description or compression: messages must be described in such a way that from the

description, the original message can be completely reconstructed. Extending the theories to *lossy* description or compression enables the formalization of more sophisticated concepts, such as ‘meaningful information’ and ‘useful information’.

Section 6: Meaningful Information, Structure Function and Learning The idea of the Kolmogorov Structure Function is to encode objects (strings) in two parts: a *structural* and a *random* part. Intuitively, the ‘meaning’ of the string resides in the structural part and the size of the structural part quantifies the ‘meaningful’ information in the message. The structural part defines a ‘model’ for the string. Kolmogorov’s structure function approach shows that the meaningful information is summarized by the *simplest* model such that the corresponding two-part description is not larger than the Kolmogorov complexity of the original string. Kolmogorov’s structure function is closely related to J. Rissanen’s *minimum description length principle*, which we briefly discuss. This is a practical theory of learning from data that can be viewed as a mathematical formalization of Occam’s Razor.

Section 7: Philosophical Implications Kolmogorov complexity has implications for the foundations of several fields, including the foundations of mathematics. The consequences are particularly profound for the foundations of *probability* and *statistics*. For example, it allows us to discern between *different forms* of randomness, which is impossible using standard probability theory. It provides a precise prescription for and justification of the use of Occam’s Razor in statistics, and leads to the distinction between *epistemological* and *metaphysical* forms of Occam’s Razor. We discuss these and other implications for the philosophy of information in Section 7, which may be read without deep knowledge of the technicalities described in Sections 4–6.

4 Kolmogorov Complexity: Details

In Section 2 we introduced Kolmogorov complexity and its main features without paying much attention to either (a) underlying motivation (why is Kolmogorov complexity a useful measure of information?) or (b) technical details. In this section, we first provide a detailed such motivation (Section 4.1). We then (Section 4.2) provide the technical background knowledge needed for a proper understanding of the concept. Based on this background knowledge, in Section 4.3 we provide a definition of Kolmogorov complexity directly in terms of Turing machines, equivalent to, but at the same time more complicated and insightful than the definition we gave in Section 2.1. With the help of this new definition, we then fill in the gaps left open in Section 2.

4.1 Motivation

Suppose we want to describe a given object by a finite binary string. We do not care whether the object has many descriptions; however, each description should describe

but one object. From among all descriptions of an object we can take the length of the shortest description as a measure of the object's complexity. It is natural to call an object "simple" if it has at least one short description, and to call it "complex" if all of its descriptions are long. But now we are in danger of falling into the trap so eloquently described in the Richard-Berry paradox, where we define a natural number as "the least natural number that cannot be described in less than twenty words." If this number does exist, we have just described it in thirteen words, contradicting its definitional statement. If such a number does not exist, then all natural numbers can be described in fewer than twenty words. We need to look very carefully at what kind of descriptions (codes) D we may allow. If D is known to both a sender and receiver, then a message x can be transmitted from sender to receiver by transmitting the description y with $D(y) = x$. We may define the descriptonal complexity of x under specification method D as the length of the shortest y such that $D(y) = x$. Obviously, this descriptonal complexity of x depends crucially on D : the syntactic framework of the description language determines the succinctness of description. Yet in order to objectively compare descriptonal complexities of objects, to be able to say " x is more complex than z ," the descriptonal complexity of x should depend on x alone. This complexity can be viewed as related to a universal description method that is a priori assumed by all senders and receivers. This complexity is optimal if no other description method assigns a lower complexity to any object.

We are not really interested in optimality with respect to all description methods. For specifications to be useful at all it is necessary that the mapping from y to $D(y)$ can be executed in an effective manner. That is, it can at least in principle be performed by humans or machines. This notion has been formalized as that of "partial recursive functions", also known simply as *computable* functions. According to generally accepted mathematical viewpoints – the so-called 'Church-Turing thesis' – it coincides with the intuitive notion of effective computation [Li and Vitányi 1997].

The set of partial recursive functions contains an optimal function that minimizes description length of every other such function. We denote this function by D_0 . Namely, for any other recursive function D , for all objects x , there is a description y of x under D_0 that is shorter than any description z of x under D . (That is, shorter up to an additive constant that is independent of x .) Complexity with respect to D_0 minorizes the complexities with respect to all partial recursive functions (this is just the invariance result (6) again).

We identify the length of the description of x with respect to a fixed specification function D_0 with the "algorithmic (descriptonal) complexity" of x . The optimality of D_0 in the sense above means that the complexity of an object x is invariant (up to an additive constant independent of x) under transition from one optimal specification function to another. Its complexity is an objective attribute of the described object alone: it is an intrinsic property of that object, and it does not depend on the description formalism. This complexity can be viewed as "absolute information content": the amount of information that needs to be transmitted between all senders and receivers when they communicate the message in absence of any other a priori knowledge that

restricts the domain of the message. This motivates the program for a general theory of algorithmic complexity and information. The four major innovations are as follows:

1. In restricting ourselves to formally effective descriptions, our definition covers every form of description that is intuitively acceptable as being effective according to general viewpoints in mathematics and logic.
2. The restriction to effective descriptions entails that there is a universal description method that minorizes the description length or complexity with respect to any other effective description method. Significantly, this implies Item 3.
3. The description length or complexity of an object is an intrinsic attribute of the object independent of the particular description method or formalizations thereof.
4. The disturbing Richard-Berry paradox above does not disappear, but resurfaces in the form of an alternative approach to proving Gödel's famous result that not every true mathematical statement is provable in mathematics (Example 4 below).

4.2 Coding Preliminaries

Strings and Natural Numbers Let \mathcal{X} be some finite or countable set. We use the notation \mathcal{X}^* to denote the set of finite *strings* or *sequences* over \mathcal{X} . For example,

$$\{0, 1\}^* = \{\epsilon, 0, 1, 00, 01, 10, 11, 000, \dots\},$$

with ϵ denoting the *empty word* ‘ ϵ ’ with no letters. We identify the natural numbers \mathbb{N} and $\{0, 1\}^*$ according to the correspondence

$$(0, \epsilon), (1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 00), (4, 01), \dots \tag{7}$$

The *length* $l(x)$ of x is the number of bits in the binary string x . For example, $l(010) = 3$ and $l(\epsilon) = 0$. If x is interpreted as an integer, we get $l(x) = \lfloor \log(x+1) \rfloor$ and, for $x \geq 2$,

$$\lfloor \log x \rfloor \leq l(x) \leq \lceil \log x \rceil. \tag{8}$$

Here, as in the sequel, $\lceil x \rceil$ is the smallest integer larger than or equal to x , $\lfloor x \rfloor$ is the largest integer smaller than or equal to x and \log denotes logarithm to base two. We shall typically be concerned with encoding finite-length binary strings by other finite-length binary strings. The emphasis is on binary strings only for convenience; observations in any alphabet can be so encoded in a way that is ‘theory neutral’.

Codes We repeatedly consider the following scenario: a *sender* (say, A) wants to communicate or transmit some information to a *receiver* (say, B). The information to be transmitted is an element from some set \mathcal{X} . It will be communicated by sending a binary string, called the *message*. When B receives the message, he can decode it again

and (hopefully) reconstruct the element of \mathcal{X} that was sent. To achieve this, A and B need to agree on a *code* or *description method* before communicating. Intuitively, this is a binary relation between *source words* and associated *code words*. The relation is fully characterized by the *decoding function*. Such a decoding function D can be any function $D : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$. The domain of D is the set of *code words* and the range of D is the set of *source words*. $D(y) = x$ is interpreted as “ y is a code word for the source word x ”. The set of all code words for source word x is the set $D^{-1}(x) = \{y : D(y) = x\}$. Hence, $E = D^{-1}$ can be called the *encoding* substitution (E is not necessarily a function). With each code D we can associate a *length function* $L_D : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that, for each source word x , $L_D(x)$ is the length of the shortest encoding of x :

$$L_D(x) = \min\{l(y) : D(y) = x\}.$$

We denote by x^* the shortest y such that $D(y) = x$; if there is more than one such y , then x^* is defined to be the first such y in lexicographical order.

In coding theory attention is often restricted to the case where the source word set is finite, say $\mathcal{X} = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$. If there is a constant l_0 such that $l(y) = l_0$ for all code words y (equivalently, $L(x) = l_0$ for all source words x), then we call D a *fixed-length* code. It is easy to see that $l_0 \geq \log N$. For instance, in teletype transmissions the source has an alphabet of $N = 32$ letters, consisting of the 26 letters in the Latin alphabet plus 6 special characters. Hence, we need $l_0 = 5$ binary digits per source letter. In electronic computers we often use the fixed-length ASCII code with $l_0 = 8$.

Prefix-free code In general we cannot uniquely recover x and y from $E(xy)$. Let E be the identity mapping. Then we have $E(00)E(00) = 0000 = E(0)E(000)$. We now introduce *prefix-free codes*, which do not suffer from this defect. A binary string x is a *proper prefix* of a binary string y if we can write $y = xz$ for $z \neq \epsilon$. A set $\{x, y, \dots\} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ is *prefix-free* if for any pair of distinct elements in the set neither is a proper prefix of the other. A function $D : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ defines a *prefix-free code*³ if its domain is prefix-free. In order to decode a code sequence of a prefix-free code, we simply start at the beginning and decode one code word at a time. When we come to the end of a code word, we know it is the end, since no code word is the prefix of any other code word in a prefix-free code. Clearly, prefix-free codes are uniquely decodable: we can always unambiguously reconstruct an outcome from its encoding. Prefix codes are not the only codes with this property; there are uniquely decodable codes which are not prefix-free. In the next section, we will define Kolmogorov complexity in terms of prefix-free codes. One may wonder why we did not opt for general uniquely decodable codes. There is a good reason for this: It turns out that every uniquely decodable code can be replaced by a prefix-free code without changing the set of code-word lengths. This follows from a sophisticated version of the Kraft inequality [Cover and Thomas 1991, Kraft-McMillan inequality, Theorem 5.5.1]; the basic Kraft inequality is found in

³The standard terminology [Cover and Thomas 1991] for such codes is ‘prefix codes’. Following Harremoës and Topsøe [2007], we use the more informative ‘prefix-free codes’.

[Harremoës and Topsøe 2007], Equation 1.1. In Shannon’s and Kolmogorov’s theories, we are only interested in code word *lengths* of uniquely decodable codes rather than actual encodings. The Kraft-McMillan inequality shows that without loss of generality, we may restrict the set of codes we work with to prefix-free codes, which are much easier to handle.

Codes for the integers; Pairing Functions Suppose we encode each binary string $x = x_1x_2 \dots x_n$ as

$$\bar{x} = \underbrace{11 \dots 1}_n 0x_1x_2 \dots x_n.$$

The resulting code is prefix-free because we can determine where the code word \bar{x} ends by reading it from left to right without backing up. Note $l(\bar{x}) = 2n + 1$; thus, we have encoded strings in $\{0, 1\}^*$ in a prefix-free manner at the price of doubling their length. We can get a much more efficient code by applying the construction above to the length $l(x)$ of x rather than x itself: define $x' = \overline{l(x)}x$, where $l(x)$ is interpreted as a binary string according to the correspondence (7). Then the code that maps x to x' is a prefix-free code satisfying, for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $l(x') = n + 2 \log n + 1$ (here we ignore the ‘rounding error’ in (8)). We call this code the *standard prefix-free code for the natural numbers* and use $L_{\mathbb{N}}(x)$ as notation for the codelength of x under this code: $L_{\mathbb{N}}(x) = l(x')$. When x is interpreted as a number (using the correspondence (7) and (8)), we see that $L_{\mathbb{N}}(x) = \log x + 2 \log \log x + 1$.

We are often interested in representing a pair of natural numbers (or binary strings) as a single natural number (binary string). To this end, we define the *standard 1-1 pairing function* $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as $\langle x, y \rangle = x'y$ (in this definition x and y are interpreted as strings).

4.3 Formal Definition of Kolmogorov Complexity

In this subsection we provide a formal definition of Kolmogorov complexity in terms of Turing machines. This will allow us to fill in some details left open in Section 2. Let T_1, T_2, \dots be a standard enumeration of all Turing machines [Li and Vitányi 1997]. The functions implemented by T_i are called the *partial recursive* or *computable* functions. For technical reasons, mainly because it simplifies the connection to Shannon’s information theory, we are interested in the so-called prefix complexity, which is associated with Turing machines for which the set of programs (inputs) resulting in a halting computation is prefix-free⁴. We can realize this by equipping the Turing machine with a one-way input tape, a separate work tape, and a one-way output tape. Such Turing machines are called prefix machines since the halting programs for any one of them form a prefix-free set.

We first define $K_{T_i}(x)$, the prefix Kolmogorov complexity of x relative to a given prefix machine T_i , where T_i is the i -th prefix machine in a standard enumeration of

⁴There exists a version of Kolmogorov complexity corresponding to programs that are not necessarily prefix-free, but we will not go into it here.

them. $K_{T_i}(x)$ is defined as the length of the shortest input sequence y such that $T_i(y) = x$; that is, the i -th Turing machine, when run with input y , produces x on its output tape and then halts. If no such input sequence exists, $K_{T_i}(x)$ remains undefined. Of course, this preliminary definition is still highly sensitive to the particular prefix machine T_i that we use. But now the ‘universal prefix machine’ comes to our rescue. Just as there exists universal ordinary Turing machines, there also exist universal prefix machines. These have the remarkable property that they can simulate every other prefix machine. More specifically, there exists a prefix machine U such that, with as input the concatenation $i'y$ (where i' is the standard encoding of integer y , Section 4.2), U outputs $T_i(y)$ and then halts. If U gets any other input then it does not halt.

Definition 1 *Let U be our reference prefix machine, i.e. for all $i \in \mathbb{N}, y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $U(\langle i, y \rangle) = U(i'y) = T_i(y)$. The prefix Kolmogorov complexity of x is defined as $K(x) := K_U(x)$, or equivalently:*

$$\begin{aligned} K(x) &= \min_z \{l(z) : U(z) = x, z \in \{0, 1\}^*\} = \\ &= \min_{i,y} \{l(i') + l(y) : T_i(y) = x, y \in \{0, 1\}^*, i \in \mathbb{N}\}. \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

We can alternatively think of z as a program that prints x and then halts, or as $z = i'y$ where y is a program such that, when T_i is input program y , it prints x and then halts.

Thus, by definition $K(x) = l(x^*)$, where x^* is the lexicographically first shortest self-delimiting (prefix-free) program for x with respect to the reference prefix machine. Consider the mapping E^* defined by $E^*(x) = x^*$. This may be viewed as the encoding function of a prefix-free code (decoding function) D^* with $D^*(x^*) = x$. By its definition, D^* is a very parsimonious code.

Example 2 In Section 2, we defined $K(x)$ as the shortest program for x in some standard programming language such as LISP or Java. We now show that this definition is equivalent to the prefix Turing machine Definition 1. Let L_1 be a universal language; for concreteness, say it is LISP. Denote the corresponding Kolmogorov complexity defined as in (3) by K_{LISP} . For the universal prefix machine U of Definition 1, there exists a program p in LISP that simulates it [Li and Vitányi 1997]. By this we mean that, for all $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$, either $p(z) = U(z)$ or neither p nor U ever halt on input z . Run with this program, our LISP computer computes the same function as U on its input, so that

$$K_{\text{LISP}}(x) \leq l(p) + K_U(x) = K_U(x) + O(1).$$

On the other hand, LISP, when equipped with the simple input/output interface described in Section 2, is a language such that for all programs p , the set of inputs y for which $p(y)$ is well-defined forms a prefix-free set. Also, as is easy to check, the set of syntactically correct LISP programs is prefix-free. Therefore, the set of strings py where p is a syntactically correct LISP program and y is an input on which p halts, is prefix-free. Thus we can construct a prefix Turing machine with some index i_0 such

that $T_{i_0}(py) = p(y)$ for all $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$. Therefore, the universal machine U satisfies for all $y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $U(i'_0py) = T_{i_0}(py) = p(y)$, so that

$$K_U(x) \leq K_{\text{LISP}}(x) + l(i'_0) = K_{\text{LISP}}(x) + O(1).$$

We are therefore justified in calling $K_{\text{LISP}}(x)$ a version of (prefix) Kolmogorov complexity. The same holds for any other universal language, as long as its set of syntactically correct programs is prefix-free. This is the case for every programming language we know of.

Example 3 [$K(x)$ as an integer function; uncomputability] The correspondence between binary strings and integers established in (7) shows that Kolmogorov complexity may equivalently be thought of as a function $K : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ where \mathbb{N} are the nonnegative integers. This interpretation is useful to prove that Kolmogorov complexity is uncomputable.

Indeed, let us assume by means of contradiction that K is computable. Then the function $\psi(m) := \min_{x \in \mathbb{N}} \{x : K(x) \geq m\}$ must be computable as well (note that x is interpreted as an integer in the definition of ψ). The definition of ψ immediately implies $K(\psi(m)) \geq m$. On the other hand, since ψ is computable, there exists a computer program of some fixed size c such that, on input m , the program outputs $\psi(m)$ and halts. Therefore, since $K(\psi(m))$ is the length of the shortest program plus input that prints $\psi(m)$, we must have that $K(\psi(m)) \leq L_{\mathbb{N}}(m) + c \leq 2 \log m + c$. Thus, we have $m \leq 2 \log m + c$ which must be false from some m onwards: contradiction.

Example 4 [Gödel's incompleteness theorem and randomness] We say that a formal system (definitions, axioms, rules of inference) is *consistent* if no statement which can be expressed in the system can be proved to be both true and false in the system. A formal system is *sound* if only true statements can be proved to be true in the system. (Hence, a sound formal system is consistent.)

Let x be a finite binary string of length n . We write ' x is c -random' if $K(x) > n - c$. That is, the shortest binary description of x has length not much smaller than x . We recall from Section 2.2 that the fraction of sequences that can be compressed by more than c bits is bounded by 2^{-c} . This shows that there are sequences which are c -random for every $c \geq 1$ and justifies the terminology: the smaller c , the more random x .

Now fix any sound formal system F that is powerful enough to express the statement ' x is c -random'. Suppose F can be described in f bits. By this we mean that there is a fixed-size program of length f such that, when input the number i , outputs a list of all valid proofs in F of length (number of symbols) i . We claim that, for all but finitely many random strings x and $c \geq 1$, the sentence ' x is c -random' is not provable in F . Suppose the contrary. Then given F , we can start to exhaustively search for a proof that some string of length $n \gg f$ is random, and print it when we find such a string x . This procedure to print x of length n uses only $\log n + f + O(1)$ bits of data, which is much less than n . But x is random by the proof and the fact that F is sound. Hence F is not consistent, which is a contradiction.

Pushing the idea of Example 4 much further, Chaitin [1987] proved a particularly strong variation of Gödel’s theorem, using Kolmogorov complexity but in a more sophisticated way, based on the number Ω defined below. Roughly, it says the following: there exists an *exponential Diophantine equation*,

$$A(n, x_1, \dots, x_m) = 0 \tag{10}$$

for some finite m , such that the following holds: let F be a formal theory of arithmetic. Then for all F that are sound and consistent, there is only a finite number of values of n for which the theory determines whether (10) has finitely or infinitely many solutions (x_1, \dots, x_m) (n is to be considered a parameter rather than a variable). For all other, infinite number of values for n , the statement ‘(10) has a finite number of solutions’ is logically independent of F .

Chaitin’s Number of Wisdom Ω An axiom system that can be effectively described by a finite string has limited information content – this was the basis for our proof of Gödel’s theorem above. On the other hand, there exist quite short strings which are mathematically well-defined but uncomputable, which have an astounding amount of information in them about the truth of mathematical statements. Following Chaitin [1975], we define the *halting probability* Ω as the real number defined by

$$\Omega = \sum_{U(p) < \infty} 2^{-l(p)},$$

the sum taken over all inputs p for which the reference machine U halts. We call Ω the halting probability because it is the probability that U halts if its program is provided by a sequence of fair coin flips. It turns out that Ω represents the *halting problem* very compactly. The following theorem is proved in [Li and Vitányi 1997]:

Theorem 5 *Let y be a binary string of length at most n . There exists an algorithm A which, given the first n bits of Ω , decides whether the universal machine U halts on input y ; i.e. A outputs 1 if U halts on y ; A outputs 0 if U does not halt on y ; and A is guaranteed to run in finite time.*

The halting problem is a prime example of a problem that is *undecidable* [Li and Vitányi 1997], from which it follows that Ω must be uncomputable.

Knowing the first 10000 bits of Ω enables us to solve the halting of all programs of less than 10000 bits. This includes programs looking for counterexamples to Goldbach’s Conjecture, Riemann’s Hypothesis, and most other conjectures in mathematics which can be refuted by a single finite counterexample. Moreover, for all axiomatic mathematical theories which can be expressed compactly enough to be conceivably interesting to human beings, say in less than 10000 bits, $\Omega_{[1:10000]}$ can be used to decide for every statement in the theory whether it is true, false, or independent. Thus, Ω is truly the number of Wisdom, and ‘can be known of, but not known, through human reason’ [C.H. Bennett and M. Gardner, *Scientific American*, 241:11(1979), 20–34].

4.4 Conditional Kolmogorov complexity

In order to fully develop the theory, we also need a notion of *conditional* Kolmogorov complexity. Intuitively, the conditional Kolmogorov complexity $K(x|y)$ of x given y can be interpreted as the shortest program p such that, when y is given to the program p as input ‘for free’, the program prints x and then halts. Based on conditional Kolmogorov complexity, we can then further define Kolmogorov complexities of more complicated objects such as functions and so on (Example 7).

The idea of providing p with an input y is realized by putting $\langle y, p \rangle$ rather than just p on the input tape of a universal *conditional* prefix machine U . This is a prefix machine U such that for all y, i, q , $U(\langle y, \langle i, q \rangle \rangle) = T_i(\langle y, q \rangle)$, whereas for any input not of this form, U does not halt. Here T_1, T_2, \dots is some effective enumeration of prefix machines. It is easy to show that such a universal conditional prefix machine U exists [Li and Vitányi 1997]. We now fix a reference conditional universal prefix machine U and define $K(x|y)$ as follows:

Definition 6 [Conditional and Joint Kolmogorov Complexity] *The conditional prefix Kolmogorov complexity of x given y (for free) is*

$$K(x|y) = \min_p \{l(p) : U(\langle y, p \rangle) = x, p \in \{0, 1\}^*\}. \quad (11)$$

$$= \min_{q,i} \{l(\langle i, q \rangle) : U(\langle y, \langle i, q \rangle \rangle) = x, q \in \{0, 1\}^*, i \in \mathbb{N}\} \quad (12)$$

$$= \min_{q,i} \{l(i') + l(q) : T_i(y'q) = x, q \in \{0, 1\}^*, i \in \mathbb{N}\}. \quad (13)$$

We define the unconditional complexity $K(x)$ as $K(x) = K(x|\epsilon)$. We define the joint complexity $K(x, y)$ as $K(x, y) = K(\langle x, y \rangle)$.

Note that we just redefined $K(x)$ so that the unconditional Kolmogorov complexity is *exactly* equal to the conditional Kolmogorov complexity with empty input. This does not contradict our earlier definition: having chosen some reference conditional prefix machine U , we can always find an effective enumeration T'_1, T'_2 and a corresponding unconditional universal prefix machine U' such that for all p , $U(\langle \epsilon, p \rangle) = U'(p)$. Then we automatically have, for all x , $K_{U'}(x) = K_U(x|\epsilon)$.

Example 7 [K for general objects: functions, distributions, sets, ...] We have defined the Kolmogorov complexity K of binary strings and natural numbers, which we identified with each other. It is straightforward to extend the definition to objects such as real-valued functions, probability distributions and sets. We briefly indicate how to do this. Intuitively, the Kolmogorov complexity of a function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is the length of the shortest prefix-free program that computes (outputs) $f(x)$ to precision $1/q$ on input $x'q'$ for $q \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$. In terms of conditional universal prefix machines:

$$K(f) = \min_{p \in \{0, 1\}^*} \{l(p) : \text{for all } q \in \{1, 2, \dots\}, x \in \mathbb{N}: |U(\langle x, \langle q, p \rangle \rangle) - f(x)| \leq 1/q\}. \quad (14)$$

The Kolmogorov complexity of a function $f : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is defined analogously, with $\langle x, \langle q, p \rangle \rangle$ replaced by $\langle x, \langle y, \langle q, p \rangle \rangle \rangle$, and $f(x)$ replaced by $f(x, y)$; similarly for functions $f : \mathbb{N}^k \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ for general $k \in \mathbb{N}$. As a special case of (14), the Kolmogorov complexity of a probability distribution P is the shortest program that outputs $P(x)$ to precision q on input $\langle x, q \rangle$. We will encounter $K(P)$ in Section 5.

The Kolmogorov complexity of *sets* can be defined in various manners [Gács, Tromp, and Vitányi 2001]. In this chapter we only consider finite sets S consisting of finite strings. One reasonable method of defining their complexity $K(S)$ is as the length of the shortest program that sequentially outputs the elements of S (in an arbitrary order) and then halts. Let $S = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$, and assume that x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n reflects the lexicographical order of the elements of S . In terms of conditional prefix machines, $K(S)$ is the length of the shortest binary program p such that $U(\langle \epsilon, p \rangle) = z$, where

$$z = \langle x_1, \langle x_2, \dots, \langle x_{n-1}, x_n \rangle \dots \rangle \rangle. \quad (15)$$

This definition of $K(S)$ will be used in Section 6. There we also need the notion of the Kolmogorov complexity of a string x given that $x \in S$, denoted as $K(x|S)$. This is defined as the length of the shortest binary program p from which the (conditional universal) U computes x from input S given literally, in the form of (15).

This concludes our treatment of the basic concepts of Kolmogorov complexity theory. In the next section we compare these to the basic concepts of Shannon’s information theory.

5 Shannon and Kolmogorov

In this section we compare Kolmogorov complexity to Shannon’s [1948] information theory, more commonly simply known as ‘information theory’. Shannon’s theory predates Kolmogorov’s by about 25 years. Both theories measure the amount of information in an object as the length of a description of the object. In the Shannon approach, however, the method of encoding objects is based on the presupposition that the objects to be encoded are outcomes of a known random source—it is only the characteristics of that random source that determine the encoding, not the characteristics of the objects that are its outcomes. In the Kolmogorov complexity approach we consider the individual objects themselves, in isolation so-to-speak, and the encoding of an object is a computer program that generates it. In the Shannon approach we are interested in the minimum expected number of bits to transmit a message from a random source of known characteristics through an error-free channel. In Kolmogorov complexity we are interested in the minimum number of bits from which a particular message can effectively be reconstructed. A little reflection reveals that this is a great difference: for *every* source emitting but two messages the Shannon information is at most 1 bit, but we can choose both messages concerned of arbitrarily high Kolmogorov complexity. Shannon stresses in his founding article that his notion is only concerned with *communication*, while Kolmogorov stresses in his founding article that his notion aims at

supplementing the gap left by Shannon theory concerning the information in individual objects. To be sure, both notions are natural: Shannon ignores the object itself but considers only the characteristics of the random source of which the object is one of the possible outcomes, while Kolmogorov considers only the object itself to determine the number of bits in the ultimate compressed version irrespective of the manner in which the object arose.

These differences notwithstanding, there exist very strong connections between both theories. In this section we give an overview of these. In Section 5.1 we recall the relation between probability distributions and codes, and we review Shannon’s fundamental notion, the *entropy*. We then (Section 5.2) indicate how Kolmogorov complexity resolves a lacuna in the Shannon theory, namely its inability to deal with information in individual objects. In Section 5.3 we make precise and explain the important relation

$$\text{Entropy} \approx \text{expected Kolmogorov complexity.}$$

Section 5.4 deals with Shannon and algorithmic *mutual information*, the second fundamental concept in both theories.

5.1 Probabilities, Codelengths, Entropy

We now briefly recall the two fundamental relations between probability distributions and codelength functions, and indicate their connection to the entropy, the fundamental concept in Shannon’s theory. These relations are essential for understanding the connection between Kolmogorov’s and Shannon’s theory. For (much) more details, we refer to Harremoës and Topsøe [2007]’s chapter in this handbook, and, in a Kolmogorov complexity context, to [Grünwald and Vitányi 2003]. We use the following notation: let P be a probability distribution defined on a finite or countable set \mathcal{X} . In the remainder of the chapter, we denote by X the random variable that takes values in \mathcal{X} ; thus $P(X = x) = P(\{x\})$ is the probability that the event $\{x\}$ obtains. We write $P(x)$ as an abbreviation of $P(X = x)$, and we write $E_P[f(X)]$ to denote the expectation of a function $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, so that $E_P[f(X)] = \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x)f(x)$.

The Two Relations between probabilities and code lengths

1. For every distribution P defined on a finite or countable set \mathcal{X} , there exists a code with lengths $L_P(x)$, satisfying, for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $L_P(x) = \lceil -\log P(x) \rceil$. This is the so-called *Shannon-Fano* code corresponding to P . The result follows directly from the Kraft inequality [Harremoës and Topsøe 2007, Section 1.2].
2. If X is distributed according to P , then the Shannon-Fano code corresponding to P is (essentially) the optimal code to use in an expected sense.

Of course, we may choose to encode outcomes of X using a code corresponding to a distribution Q , with lengths $\lceil -\log Q(x) \rceil$, whereas the outcomes are actually distributed according to $P \neq Q$. But, as expressed in the *noiseless coding theorem*

or, more abstractly, in [Harremoës and Topsøe 2007, Section 1.3] as the *First main theorem of information theory*, such a code cannot be significantly better, and may in fact be much worse than the code with lengths $\lceil -\log P(X) \rceil$: the noiseless coding theorem says that

$$E_P[-\log P(X)] \leq \min_{C: C \text{ is a prefix-free code}} E_P[L_C(X)] \leq E_P[-\log P(X)] + 1, \quad (16)$$

so that it follows in particular that the expected length of the Shannon-Fano code satisfies

$$E_P[-\log P(X)] \leq E_P[-\log P(X)] + 1 \leq \min_{C: C \text{ is a prefix-free code}} E_P[L_C(X)] + 1.$$

and is thus always within just bit of the code that is optimal in expectation.

In his 1948 paper, Shannon proposed a measure of information in a distribution, which he called the ‘entropy’, a concept discussed at length in the chapter by Harremoës and Topsøe [2007] in this handbook. It is equal to the quantity appearing on the left and on the right in (16):

Definition 8 [Entropy] Let \mathcal{X} be a finite or countable set, let X be a random variable taking values in \mathcal{X} with distribution P . Then the (Shannon-) *entropy* of random variable X is given by

$$H(P) = - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} P(x) \log P(x), \quad (17)$$

Entropy is defined here as a functional mapping a distribution on \mathcal{X} to real numbers. In practice, we often deal with a pair of random variables (X, Y) defined on a joint space $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$. Then P is the joint distribution of (X, Y) , and P_X is its corresponding marginal distribution on X , $P_X(x) = \sum_y P(x, y)$. In that case, rather than writing $H(P_X)$ it is customary to write $H(X)$; we shall follow this convention below.

Entropy can be interpreted in a number of ways. The noiseless coding theorem (16) gives a precise coding-theoretic interpretation: it shows that the entropy of P is essentially equal to the average code length when encoding an outcome of P , if outcomes are encoded using the optimal code (the code that minimizes this average code length).

5.2 A Lacuna in Shannon’s Theory

Example 9 Assuming that x is emitted by a random source X with probability $P(x)$, we can transmit x using the Shannon-Fano code. This uses (up to rounding) $-\log P(x)$ bits. By Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem this is optimal *on average*, the average taken over the probability distribution of outcomes from the source. Thus, if $x = 00 \dots 0$ (n zeros), and the random source emits n -bit messages with equal probability $1/2^n$ each, then we require n bits to transmit x (the same as transmitting x literally). However, we can transmit x in about $\log n$ bits if we ignore probabilities and just describe x individually. Thus, the optimality with respect to the average may be very sub-optimal in individual cases.

In Shannon’s theory ‘information’ is fully determined by the probability distribution on the set of possible messages, and unrelated to the meaning, structure or content of individual messages. In many cases this is problematic, since the distribution generating outcomes may be unknown to the observer or (worse), may not exist at all⁵. For example, can we answer a question like “what is the information in this book” by viewing it as an element of a set of possible books with a probability distribution on it? This seems unlikely. Kolmogorov complexity provides a measure of information that, unlike Shannon’s, does not rely on (often untenable) probabilistic assumptions, and that takes into account the phenomenon that ‘regular’ strings are compressible. Thus, it measures the information content of an *individual finite object*. The fact that such a measure exists is surprising, and indeed, it comes at a price: unlike Shannon’s, Kolmogorov’s measure is asymptotic in nature, and not computable in general. Still, the resulting theory is closely related to Shannon’s, as we now discuss.

5.3 Entropy and Expected Kolmogorov Complexity

We call a distribution P computable if it can be computed by a finite-size program, i.e. if it has finite Kolmogorov complexity $K(P)$ (Example 7). The set of computable distributions is very large: it contains, for example, all Markov chains of each order with rational-valued parameters. In the following discussion we shall restrict ourselves to computable distributions; extensions to the uncomputable case are discussed by Grünwald and Vitányi [2003].

If X is distributed according to some distribution P , then the optimal (in the average sense) code to use is the Shannon-Fano code. But now suppose it is only known that $P \in \mathcal{P}$, where \mathcal{P} is a large set of computable distributions, perhaps even the set of all computable distributions. Now it is not clear what code is optimal. We may try the Shannon-Fano code for a particular $P \in \mathcal{P}$, but such a code will typically lead to very large expected code lengths if X turns out to be distributed according to some $Q \in \mathcal{P}, Q \neq P$. We may ask whether there exists another code that is ‘almost’ as good as the Shannon-Fano code for P , no matter what $P \in \mathcal{P}$ actually generates the sequence? We now show that, (perhaps surprisingly), the answer is yes.

Let X be a random variable taking on values in the set $\{0,1\}^*$ of binary strings of arbitrary length, and let P be the distribution of X . $K(x)$ is fixed for each x and gives the shortest code word length (but only up to a fixed constant). It is *independent* of the probability distribution P . Nevertheless, if we weigh each individual code word length for x with its probability $P(x)$, then the resulting P -expected code word length $\sum_x P(x)K(x)$ almost achieves the minimal average code word length $H(P) = -\sum_x P(x)\log P(x)$. This is expressed in the following theorem (taken from [Li and Vitányi 1997]):

⁵Even if we adopt a Bayesian (subjective) interpretation of probability, this problem remains [Grünwald 2007].

Theorem 10 *Let P be a computable probability distribution on $\{0, 1\}^*$. Then*

$$0 \leq \left(\sum_x P(x)K(x) - H(P) \right) \leq K(P) + O(1).$$

The theorem becomes interesting if we consider sequences of P that assign mass to binary strings of increasing length. For example, let P_n be the distribution on $\{0, 1\}^n$ that corresponds to n independent tosses of a coin with bias q , where q is computable (e.g., a rational number). We have $K(P_n) = O(\log n)$, since we can compute P_n with a program of constant size and input n, q with length $l(n') + l(q') = O(\log n)$. On the other hand, $H(P_n) = nH(P_1)$ increases linearly in n (see, e.g., the chapter by Harremoës and Topsøe [2007] in this handbook; see also paragraph 1(c) in Section 2.2 of this chapter). So for large n , the optimal code for P_n requires on average $nH(P_1)$ bits, and the Kolmogorov code E^* requires only $O(\log n)$ bits extra. Dividing by n , we see that the additional number of bits needed per outcome using the Kolmogorov code goes to 0. Thus, remarkably, whereas the entropy is the expected codelength according to P under the optimal code for P (a code that will be wildly different for different P), there exists a single code (the Kolmogorov code), which is asymptotically almost optimal for *all* computable P .

5.4 Mutual Information

Apart from entropy, the *mutual information* is perhaps the most important concept in Shannon's theory. Similarly, apart from Kolmogorov complexity itself, the *algorithmic mutual information* is one of the most important concepts in Kolmogorov's theory. In this section we review Shannon's notion, we introduce Kolmogorov's notion, and then we provide an analogue of Theorem 10 which says that essentially, Shannon mutual information is averaged algorithmic mutual information.

Shannon Mutual Information How much information can a random variable X convey about a random variable Y ? This is determined by the (Shannon) *mutual information* between X and Y . Formally, it is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} I(X; Y) &:= H(X) - H(X|Y) \\ &= H(X) + H(Y) - H(X, Y) \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

where $H(X|Y)$ is the conditional entropy of X given Y , and $H(X, Y)$ is the joint entropy of X and Y ; the definition of $H(X, Y), H(X|Y)$ as well as an alternative but equivalent definition of $I(X; Y)$, can be found in [Harremoës and Topsøe 2007]. The equality between the first and second line follows by straightforward rewriting. The mutual information can be thought of as the expected (average) reduction in the number of bits needed to encode X , when an outcome of Y is given for free. In accord with intuition, it is easy to show that $I(X; Y) \geq 0$, with equality if and only if X and Y are independent, i.e. X provides no information about Y . Moreover, and

less intuitively, a straightforward calculation shows that this information is *symmetric*: $I(X; Y) = I(Y; X)$.

Algorithmic Mutual Information In order to define algorithmic mutual information, it will be convenient to introduce some new notation: We will denote by $\stackrel{\pm}{<}$ an inequality to within an additive constant. More precisely, let f, g be functions from $\{0, 1\}^*$ to \mathbb{R} . Then by ‘ $f(x) \stackrel{\pm}{<} g(x)$ ’ we mean that there exists a c such that for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $f(x) < g(x) + c$. We write ‘ $f(x) \stackrel{\pm}{>} g(x)$ ’ if $g(x) \stackrel{\pm}{<} f(x)$. We denote by $\stackrel{\pm}{=}$ the situation when both $\stackrel{\pm}{<}$ and $\stackrel{\pm}{>}$ hold.

Since $K(x, y) = K(x'y)$ (Section 4.4), trivially, the symmetry property holds: $K(x, y) \stackrel{\pm}{=} K(y, x)$. An interesting property is the “Additivity of Complexity” property

$$K(x, y) \stackrel{\pm}{=} K(x) + K(y | x^*) \stackrel{\pm}{=} K(y) + K(x | y^*). \quad (19)$$

where x^* is the first (in standard enumeration order) shortest prefix program that generates x and then halts. (19) is the Kolmogorov complexity equivalent of the entropy equality $H(X, Y) = H(X) + H(Y|X)$ (see Section I.5 in the chapter by Harremoës and Topsøe [2007]). That this latter equality holds is true by simply rewriting both sides of the equation according to the definitions of averages of joint and marginal probabilities. In fact, potential individual differences are averaged out. But in the Kolmogorov complexity case we do nothing like that: it is quite remarkable that additivity of complexity also holds for individual objects. The result (19) is due to Gács [1974], can be found as Theorem 3.9.1 in [Li and Vitányi 1997] and has a difficult proof. It is perhaps instructive to point out that the version with just x and y in the conditionals doesn’t hold with $\stackrel{\pm}{=}$, but holds up to additive logarithmic terms that cannot be eliminated.

To define the algorithmic mutual information between two individual objects x and y with no probabilities involved, it is instructive to first recall the probabilistic notion (18). The algorithmic definition is, in fact, entirely analogous, with H replaced by K and random variables replaced by individual sequences or their generating programs: The *information in y about x* is defined as

$$I(y : x) = K(x) - K(x | y^*) \stackrel{\pm}{=} K(x) + K(y) - K(x, y), \quad (20)$$

where the second equality is a consequence of (19) and states that this information is symmetric, $I(x : y) \stackrel{\pm}{=} I(y : x)$, and therefore we can talk about *mutual information*.⁶

Theorem 10 showed that the entropy of distribution P is approximately equal to the expected (under P) Kolmogorov complexity. Theorem 11 gives the analogous result for the mutual information.

⁶The notation of the algorithmic (individual) notion $I(x : y)$ distinguishes it from the probabilistic (average) notion $I(X; Y)$. We deviate slightly from Li and Vitányi [1997] where $I(y : x)$ is defined as $K(x) - K(x | y)$.

Theorem 11 *Let P be a computable probability distribution on $\{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^*$. Then*

$$I(X; Y) - K(P) \stackrel{+}{<} \sum_x \sum_y p(x, y) I(x : y) \stackrel{+}{<} I(X; Y) + 2K(P).$$

Thus, analogously to Theorem 10, we see that the expectation of the algorithmic mutual information $I(x : y)$ is close to the probabilistic mutual information $I(X; Y)$.

Theorems 10 and 11 do not stand on their own: it turns out that just about *every* concept in Shannon’s theory has an analogue in Kolmogorov’s theory, and in all such cases, these concepts can be related by theorems saying that *if* data are generated probabilistically, then the Shannon concept is close to the expectation of the corresponding Kolmogorov concept. Examples are the probabilistic vs. the algorithmic sufficient statistics, and the probabilistic rate-distortion function [Cover and Thomas 1991] vs. the algorithmic Kolmogorov structure function. The algorithmic sufficient statistic and structure function are discussed in the next section. For a comparison to their counterparts in Shannon’s theory, we refer to [Grünwald and Vitányi 2004].

6 Meaningful Information

The information contained in an individual finite object (like a finite binary string) is measured by its Kolmogorov complexity—the length of the shortest binary program that computes the object. Such a shortest program contains no redundancy: every bit is information; but is it meaningful information? If we flip a fair coin to obtain a finite binary string, then with overwhelming probability that string constitutes its own shortest program. However, also with overwhelming probability all the bits in the string are meaningless information, random noise. On the other hand, let an object x be a sequence of observations of heavenly bodies. Then x can be described by the binary string pd , where p is the description of the laws of gravity and the observational parameter setting, while d accounts for the measurement errors: we can divide the information in x into meaningful information p and accidental information d . The main task for statistical inference and learning theory is to distill the meaningful information present in the data. The question arises whether it is possible to separate meaningful information from accidental information, and if so, how. The essence of the solution to this problem is revealed as follows. As shown by Vereshchagin and Vitányi [2004], for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we have

$$K(x) = \min_{i,p} \{K(i) + l(p) : T_i(p) = x\} + O(1), \tag{21}$$

where the minimum is taken over $p \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $i \in \{1, 2, \dots\}$.

To get some intuition why (21) holds, note that the original definition (1) expresses that $K(x)$ is the sum of the description length $L_{\mathbb{N}}(i)$ of some Turing machine i when encoded using the standard code for the integers, plus the length of a program such that $T_i(p) = x$. (21) expresses that the first term in this sum may be replaced by $K(i)$,

i.e. the *shortest* effective description of i . It is clear that (21) is never larger than (9) plus some constant (the size of a computer program implementing the standard encoding/decoding of integers). The reason why (21) is also never smaller than (9) minus some constant is that there exists a Turing machine T_k such that, for all i, p , $T_k(i^*p) = T_i(p)$, where i^* is the shortest program that prints i and then halts, i.e. for all i, p , $U(\langle k, i^*p \rangle) = T_i(p)$ where U is the reference machine used in Definition 1. Thus, $K(x)$ is bounded by the constant length $l(k')$ describing k , plus $l(i^*) = K(i)$, plus $l(p)$.

The expression (21) shows that we can think of Kolmogorov complexity as the length of a *two-part code*. This way, $K(x)$ is viewed as the shortest length of a two-part code for x , one part describing a Turing machine T , or *model*, for the *regular* aspects of x , and the second part describing the *irregular* aspects of x in the form of a program p to be interpreted by T . The regular, or “valuable,” information in x is constituted by the bits in the “model” while the random or “useless” information of x constitutes the remainder. This leaves open the crucial question: How to choose T and p that together describe x ? In general, many combinations of T and p are possible, but we want to find a T that describes the meaningful aspects of x . Below we show that this can be achieved using the *Algorithmic Minimum Sufficient Statistic*. This theory, built on top of Kolmogorov complexity so to speak, has its roots in two talks by Kolmogorov [1974a, 1974b]. Based on Kolmogorov’s remarks, the theory has been further developed by several authors, culminating in Vereshchagin and Vitányi [2004], some of the key ideas of which we outline below.

Data and Model We restrict attention to the following setting: we observe data x in the form of a finite binary string of some length n . As models for the data, we consider finite sets S that contain x . In statistics and machine learning, the use of finite sets is nonstandard: one usually models the data using probability distributions or functions. However, the restriction of sets is just a matter of convenience: the theory we are about to present generalizes straightforwardly to the case where the models are arbitrary computable probability density functions and, in fact, other model classes such as computable functions [Vereshchagin and Vitányi 2004]; see also Section 6.3.

The intuition behind the idea of a set as a model is the following: informally, ‘ S is a good model for x ’ or equivalently, S captures all structure in x , if, in a sense to be made precise further below, it summarizes all simple properties of x . In Section 6.1 below, we work towards the definition of the algorithmic minimal sufficient statistic (AMSS) via the fundamental notions of ‘typicality’ of data and ‘optimality’ of a set. Section 6.2 investigates the AMSS further in terms of the important *Kolmogorov Structure Function*. In Section 6.3, we relate the AMSS to the more well-known *Minimum Description Length Principle*.

6.1 Algorithmic Sufficient Statistic

We are now about to formulate the central notions ‘ x is typical for S ’ and ‘ S is optimal for x ’. Both are necessary, but not sufficient requirements for S to precisely capture

the ‘meaningful information’ in x . After having introduced optimal sets, we investigate what further requirements we need. The development will make heavy use of the Kolmogorov complexity of sets, and conditioned on sets. These notions, written as $K(S)$ and $K(x|S)$, were defined in Example 7.

6.1.1 Typical Elements

Consider a string x of length n and prefix complexity $K(x) = k$. We look for the *structure* or *regularity* in x that is to be summarized with a set S of which x is a *random* or *typical* member: given S containing x , the element x cannot be described significantly shorter than by its maximal length index in S , that is, $K(x | S) \geq \log |S| + O(1)$. Formally,

Definition 12 Let $\beta \geq 0$ be an agreed-upon, fixed, constant. A finite binary string x is a *typical* or *random* element of a set S of finite binary strings, if $x \in S$ and

$$K(x | S) \geq \log |S| - \beta. \tag{22}$$

We will not indicate the dependence on β explicitly, but the constants in all our inequalities ($O(1)$) will be allowed to be functions of this β .

This definition requires a finite S . Note that the notion of typicality is not absolute but depends on fixing the constant implicit in the O -notation.

Example 13 Consider the set S of binary strings of length n whose every odd position is 0. Let x be an element of this set in which the subsequence of bits in even positions is an incompressible string. Then x is a typical element of S . But x is also a typical element of the set $\{x\}$.

Note that, if x is not a typical element of S , then S is certainly not a ‘good model’ for x in the intuitive sense described above: S does not capture all regularity in x . However, the example above ($S = \{x\}$) shows that even if x is typical for S , S may still not capture ‘all meaningful information in x ’.

Example 14 If y is not a typical element of S , this means that it has some simple special property that singles it out from the vast majority of elements in S . This can actually be proven formally [Vitányi 2005]. Here we merely give an example. Let S be as in Example 13. Let y be an element of S in which the subsequence of bits in even positions contains two times as many 1s than 0s. Then y is not a typical element of S : the overwhelming majority of elements of S have about equally many 0s as 1s in even positions (this follows by simple combinatorics). As shown in [Vitányi 2005], this implies that $K(y|S) \ll |\log S|$, so that y is not typical.

6.1.2 Optimal Sets

Let x be a binary data string of length n . For every finite set $S \ni x$, we have $K(x) \leq K(S) + \log |S| + O(1)$, since we can describe x by giving S and the index of x in a standard enumeration of S . Clearly this can be implemented by a Turing machine computing the finite set S and a program p giving the index of x in S . The size of a set containing x measures intuitively the number of properties of x that are represented: The largest set is $\{0, 1\}^n$ and represents only one property of x , namely, being of length n . It clearly “underfits” as explanation or model for x . The smallest set containing x is the singleton set $\{x\}$ and represents all conceivable properties of x . It clearly “overfits” as explanation or model for x .

There are two natural measures of suitability of such a set as a model for x . We might prefer either (a) the simplest set, or (b) the smallest set, as corresponding to the most likely structure ‘explaining’ x . Both the largest set $\{0, 1\}^n$ [having low complexity of about $K(n)$] and the singleton set $\{x\}$ [having high complexity of about $K(x)$], while certainly statistics for x , would indeed be considered poor explanations. We would like to balance simplicity of model vs. size of model. Both measures relate to the optimality of a two-stage description of x using a finite set S that contains it. Elaborating on the two-part code described above,

$$\begin{aligned} K(x) &\leq K(S) + K(x | S) + O(1) \\ &\leq K(S) + \log |S| + O(1), \end{aligned} \tag{23}$$

where the first inequality follows because there exists a program p producing x that first computes S and then computes x based on S ; if p is not the shortest program generating x , then the inequality is strict. The second substitution of $K(x | S)$ by $\log |S| + O(1)$ uses the fact that x is an element of S . The closer the right-hand side of (23) gets to the left-hand side, the better the two-stage description of x is. This implies a trade-off between meaningful model information, $K(S)$, and meaningless “noise” $\log |S|$. A set S (containing x) for which (23) holds with equality,

$$K(x) = K(S) + \log |S| + O(1), \tag{24}$$

is called *optimal*. The first line of (23) implies that if a set S is optimal for x , then x must be a typical element of S . However, the converse does not hold: a data string x can be typical for a set S without that set S being optimal for x .

Example 15 It can be shown that the set S of Example 13 is also optimal, and so is $\{x\}$. Sets for which x is typical form a much wider class than optimal sets for x : the set $\{x, y\}$ is still typical for x but with most y it will be too complex to be optimal for x . A less artificial example can be found in [Vereshchagin and Vitányi 2004].

While ‘optimality’ is a refinement of ‘typicality’, the fact that $\{x\}$ is still an optimal set for x shows that it is still not sufficient by itself to capture the notion of ‘meaningful information’. In order to discuss the necessary refinement, we first need to connect

optimal sets to the notion of a ‘sufficient statistic’, which, as its name suggests, has its roots in the statistical literature.

6.1.3 Algorithmic Sufficient Statistic

A *statistic* of the data $x = x_1 \dots x_n$ is a function $f(x)$. Essentially, every function will do. For example, $f_1(x) = n$, $f_2(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$, $f_3(x) = n - f_2(x)$, and $f_4(x) = f_2(x)/n$, are statistics. A “sufficient” statistic of the data contains all information in the data about the model. In introducing the notion of sufficiency in classical statistics, Fisher [1922] stated: “The statistic chosen should summarize the whole of the relevant information supplied by the sample. This may be called the Criterion of Sufficiency . . . In the case of the normal distributions it is evident that the second moment is a sufficient statistic for estimating the standard deviation.” For example, in the Bernoulli model (repeated coin flips with outcomes 0 and 1 according to fixed bias), the statistic f_4 is sufficient. It gives the mean of the outcomes and estimates the bias of the Bernoulli process, which is the only relevant model information. For the classic (probabilistic) theory see, for example, [Cover and Thomas 1991]. Gács, Tromp, and Vitányi [2001] develop an algorithmic theory of sufficient statistics (relating individual data to individual model) and establish its relation to the probabilistic version; this work is extended by Grünwald and Vitányi [2004]. The algorithmic basics are as follows: Intuitively, a model expresses the essence of the data if the two-part code describing the data consisting of the model and the data-to-model code is as concise as the best one-part description. In other words, we call a shortest program for an optimal set with respect to x an *algorithmic sufficient statistic* for x .

Example 16 (Sufficient Statistic) Let us look at a coin toss example. Let k be a number in the range $0, 1, \dots, n$ of complexity $\log n + O(1)$ given n and let x be a string of length n having k 1s of complexity $K(x \mid n, k) \geq \log \binom{n}{k}$ given n, k . This x can be viewed as a typical result of tossing a coin with a bias about $p = k/n$. A two-part description of x is given by first specifying the number k of 1s in x , followed by the index $j \leq \log |S|$ of x in the set S of strings of length n with k 1s. This set is optimal, since, to within $O(1)$, $K(x) = K(x, \langle n, k \rangle) = K(n, k) + K(x \mid n, k) = K(S) + \log |S|$. The shortest program for S , which amounts to an encoding of n and then k given n , is an algorithmic sufficient statistic for x .

The optimal set that admits the shortest possible program (or rather that shortest program) is called *algorithmic minimal sufficient statistic* of x . In general there can be more than one such set and corresponding program:

Definition 17 (Algorithmic minimal sufficient statistic) An algorithmic sufficient statistic of x is a shortest program for a set S containing x that is optimal, i.e. it satisfies (24). An algorithmic sufficient statistic with optimal set S is minimal if there exists no optimal set S' with $K(S') < K(S)$.

The algorithmic minimal sufficient statistic (AMSS) divides the information in x in a relevant structure expressed by the set S , and the remaining randomness with respect to that structure, expressed by x 's index in S of $\log |S|$ bits. The shortest program for S is itself alone an algorithmic definition of structure, without a probabilistic interpretation.

Example 18 (Example 13, Cont.) The shortest program for the set S of Example 13 is a minimum sufficient statistic for the string x mentioned in that example. The program generating the set $\{x\}$, while still an algorithmic sufficient statistic, is not a minimal sufficient statistic.

Example 19 (Example 16, Cont.) The S of Example 16 encodes the number of 1s in x . The shortest program for S is an algorithmic minimal sufficient statistic for *most* x of length n with k 1's, since only a fraction of at most 2^{-m} x 's of length n with k 1s can have $K(x) < \log |S| - m$ (Section 4). But of course there exist x 's with k ones which have much more regularity. An example is the string starting with k 1's followed by $n - k$ 0's. For such strings, S is not optimal anymore, nor is S an algorithmic sufficient statistic.

To analyze the minimal sufficient statistic further, it is useful to place a constraint on the maximum complexity of set $K(S)$, say $K(S) \leq \alpha$, and to investigate what happens if we vary α . The result is the *Kolmogorov Structure Function*, which we now discuss.

6.2 The Kolmogorov Structure Function

The *Kolmogorov structure function* [Kolmogorov 1974a; Kolmogorov 1974b; Vereshchagin and Vitányi 2004] h_x of given data x is defined by

$$h_x(\alpha) = \min_S \{\log |S| : S \ni x, K(S) \leq \alpha\}, \quad (25)$$

where $S \ni x$ is a contemplated model for x , and α is a non-negative integer value bounding the complexity of the contemplated S 's. Clearly, the Kolmogorov structure function is nonincreasing and reaches $\log |\{x\}| = 0$ for $\alpha = K(x) + c_1$ where c_1 is the number of bits required to change x into $\{x\}$. For every $S \ni x$ we have (23), and hence $K(x) \leq \alpha + h_x(\alpha) + O(1)$; that is, the function $h_x(\alpha)$ never decreases more than a fixed independent constant below the diagonal *sufficiency line* L defined by $L(\alpha) + \alpha = K(x)$, which is a lower bound on $h_x(\alpha)$ and is approached to within a constant distance by the graph of h_x for certain α 's (e.g., for $\alpha = K(x) + c_1$). For these α 's we thus have $\alpha + h_x(\alpha) = K(x) + O(1)$; a model corresponding to such an α (witness for $h_x(\alpha)$) is a sufficient statistic, and it is *minimal* for the least such α [Cover and Thomas 1991; Gács, Tromp, and Vitányi 2001]. This is depicted in Figure 1. Note once again that the structure function is defined relative to given data (a single sequence x); different sequences result in different structure functions. Yet, all these different functions share some properties: for all x , the function $h_x(\alpha)$ will lie above the diagonal sufficiency line for all $\alpha \leq \alpha_x$. Here α_x is the complexity $K(S)$ of the AMSS for x . For $\alpha \geq \alpha_x$,




Figure 1: Structure functions $h_x(i)$, $\beta_x(\alpha)$, $\lambda_x(\alpha)$, and minimal sufficient statistic.

the function $h_x(\alpha)$ remains within a constant of the diagonal. For stochastic strings generated by a simple computable distribution (finite $K(P)$), the sufficiency line will typically be first hit for α close to 0, since the AMSS will grow as $O(\log n)$. For example, if x is generated by independent fair coin flips, then, with probability 1, one AMSS will be $S = \{0, 1\}^n$ with complexity $K(S) = K(n) = O(\log n)$. One may suspect that all intuitively ‘random’ sequences have a small sufficient statistic of order $O(\log n)$ or smaller. Surprisingly, this turns out not to be the case, as we show in Example 21.

Example 20 (Lossy Compression) The Kolmogorov structure function $h_x(\alpha)$ is relevant to lossy compression (used, e.g., to compress images). Assume we need to compress x to α bits where $\alpha \ll K(x)$. Of course this implies some loss of information present in x . One way to select redundant information to discard is as follows: let S_0 be the set generated by the Algorithmic Minimum Sufficient Statistic S_0^* (S_0^* is a shortest program that prints S_0 and halts). Assume that $l(S_0^*) = K(S_0) \leq \alpha$. Since S_0 is an optimal set, it is also a typical set, so that $K(x|S_0) \approx \log |S_0|$. We compress x by S_0^* , taking α bits. To reconstruct an x' close to x , a decompressor can first reconstruct the set S_0 , and then select an element x' of S_0 uniformly at random. This ensures that with very high probability x' is itself also a typical element of S_0 , so it has the same properties that x has. Therefore, x' should serve the purpose of the message x as well as does x itself. However, if $l(S_0^*) > \alpha$, then it is not possible to compress all meaningful information of x into α bits. We may instead encode, among all sets S with $K(S) \leq \alpha$, the one with the smallest $\log |S|$, achieving $h_x(\alpha)$. But inevitably, this set will not capture all the structural properties of x .

Let us look at an example. To transmit a picture of “rain” through a channel with limited capacity α , one can transmit the indication that this is a picture of the rain and




Figure 2: Data string x is “positive random” or “stochastic” and data string y is just “negative random” or “non-stochastic”.

the particular drops may be chosen by the receiver at random. In this interpretation, the complexity constraint α determines how “random” or “typical” x will be with respect to the chosen set S —and hence how “indistinguishable” from the original x the randomly reconstructed x' can be expected to be.

We end this section with an example of a strange consequence of Kolmogorov’s theory:

Example 21 “Positive” and “Negative” Individual Randomness: Gács, Tromp, and Vitányi [2001] showed the existence of strings for which essentially the singleton set consisting of the string itself is a minimal sufficient statistic (Section 6.1). While a sufficient statistic of an object yields a two-part code that is as short as the shortest one part code, restricting the complexity of the allowed statistic may yield two-part codes that are considerably longer than the best one-part code (so that the statistic is insufficient). In fact, for every object there is a complexity bound below which this happens; this is just the point where the Kolmogorov structure function hits the diagonal. If that bound is small (logarithmic) we call the object “stochastic” since it has a simple satisfactory explanation (sufficient statistic). Thus, Kolmogorov [1974a] makes the important distinction of an object being random in the “negative” sense by having this bound high (it has high complexity and is not a typical element of a low-complexity model), and an object being random in the “positive, probabilistic” sense by both having this bound small and itself having complexity considerably exceeding this bound (like a string x of length n with $K(x) \geq n$, being typical for the set $\{0, 1\}^n$, or the uniform probability distribution over that set, while this set or probability distribution has complexity $K(n) + O(1) = O(\log n)$). We depict the distinction in Figure 2.

6.3 The Minimum Description Length Principle

Learning The main goal of statistics and machine learning is to learn from data. One common way of interpreting ‘learning’ is as a search for the structural, regular properties of the data – all the patterns that occur in it. On a very abstract level, this is just what is achieved by the AMSS, which can thus be related to learning, or, more generally, inductive inference. There is however another, much more well-known method for learning based on data compression. This is the Minimum Description Length (MDL) Principle, mostly developed by J. Rissanen [1978, 1989] – see [Grünwald 2007] for a recent introduction; see also [Wallace 2005] for the related MML Principle. Rissanen took Kolmogorov complexity as an informal starting point, but was not aware of the AMSS when he developed the first, and, with hindsight, somewhat crude version of MDL [Rissanen 1978], which roughly says that the best theory to explain given data x is the one that minimizes the sum of

1. The length, in bits, of the description of the theory, plus
2. The length, in bits, of the description of the data x when the data is described with the help of the theory.

Thus, data is encoded by first encoding a theory (constituting the ‘structural’ part of the data) and then encoding the data using the properties of the data that are prescribed by the theory. Picking the theory minimizing the total description length leads to an automatic trade-off between complexity of the chosen theory and its goodness of fit on the data. This provides a principle of inductive inference that may be viewed as a mathematical formalization of ‘Occam’s Razor’. It automatically protects against overfitting, a central concern of statistics: when allowing models of arbitrary complexity, we are always in danger that we model random fluctuations rather than the trend in the data [Grünwald 2007].

The MDL Principle has been designed so as to be practically useful. This means that the codes used to describe a ‘theory’ are not based on Kolmogorov complexity. However, there exists an ‘ideal’ version of MDL [Li and Vitányi 1997; Barron and Cover 1991] which does rely on Kolmogorov complexity. Within our framework (binary data, models as sets), it becomes [Vereshchagin and Vitányi 2004; Vitányi 2005]: pick a set $S \ni x$ minimizing the two-part codelength

$$K(S) - \log |S|. \tag{26}$$

In other words: any “optimal set” (as defined in Section 6.1.2) is regarded as a good explanation of the theory. It follows that every set S that is an AMSS also minimizes the two-part codelength to within $O(1)$. However, as we already indicated, there exist optimal sets S (that, because of their optimality, may be selected by MDL), that are not minimal sufficient statistics. As explained by Vitányi [2005], these do not capture the idea of ‘summarizing all structure in x ’. Thus, the AMSS may be considered a refinement of the idealized MDL approach.

Practical MDL The practical MDL approach uses probability distributions rather than sets as models. Typically, one restricts to distributions in some model class such as the set of all Markov chain distributions of each order, or the set of all polynomials f of each degree, where f expresses that $Y = f(X) + Z$, and Z is some normally distributed noise variable (this makes f a ‘probabilistic’ hypothesis). These model classes are still ‘large’ in that they cannot be described by a finite number of parameters; but they are simple enough so that admit efficiently computable versions of MDL – unlike the ideal version above which, because it involves Kolmogorov complexity, is uncomputable. The Kolmogorov complexity, set-based theory has to be adjusted at various places to deal with such practical models, one reason being that they have uncountably many elements. MDL has been successful in practical statistical and machine learning problems where overfitting is a real concern [Grünwald 2007]. Technically, MDL algorithms are very similar to the popular Bayesian methods, but the underlying philosophy is very different: MDL is based on finding structure in *individual data* sequences; distributions (models) are viewed as *representation languages for expressing useful properties of the data*; they are neither viewed as objectively existing but unobservable objects according to which data are ‘generated’; nor are they viewed as representing subjective degrees of belief, as in a mainstream Bayesian interpretation.

In recent years, ever more sophisticated refinements of the original MDL have developed [Rissanen 1996; Rissanen and Tabus 2005; Grünwald 2007]. For example, in modern MDL approaches, one uses *universal codes* which may be two-part, but in practice are often *one-part* codes.

7 Philosophical Implications and Conclusion

We have given an overview of algorithmic information theory, focusing on some of its most important aspects: Kolmogorov complexity, algorithmic mutual information, their relations to entropy and Shannon mutual information, the Algorithmic Minimal Sufficient Statistic and the Kolmogorov Structure Function, and their relation to ‘meaningful information’. Throughout the chapter we emphasized insights that, in our view, are ‘philosophical’ in nature. It is now time to harvest and make the philosophical connections explicit. Below we first discuss some implications of algorithmic information theory on the philosophy of (general) mathematics, probability theory and statistics. We then end the chapter by discussing the philosophical implications for ‘information’ itself. As we shall see, it turns out that nearly all of these philosophical implications are somehow related to *randomness*.

Philosophy of Mathematics: Randomness in Mathematics In and after Example 4 we indicated that the ideas behind Kolmogorov complexity are intimately related to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. The finite Kolmogorov complexity of any effective axiom system implied the existence of bizarre equations like (10), whose full solution is, in a sense, random: *no* effective axiom system can fully determine the solutions of this

single equation. In this context, Chaitin writes: “This is a region in which mathematical truth has no discernible structure or pattern and appears to be completely random [...] Quantum physics has shown that there is randomness in nature. I believe that we have demonstrated [...] that randomness is already present in pure Mathematics. This does not mean that the universe and Mathematics are completely lawless, it means that laws of a different kind apply: statistical laws. [...] Perhaps number theory should be pursued more openly in the spirit of an experimental science!”.

Philosophy of Probability: Individual Randomness The statement ‘ x is a random sequence’ is essentially meaningless in classical probability theory, which can only make statements that hold for ensembles, such as ‘relative frequencies converge to probabilities *with high probability*, or *with probability 1*’. But in reality we only observe one sequence. What then does the statement ‘this sequence is a typical outcome of distribution P ’ or, equivalently, is ‘random with respect to P ’ tell us about the sequence? We might think that it means that the sequence satisfies all properties that hold with P -probability 1. But this will not work: if we identify a ‘property’ with the set of sequences satisfying it, then it is easy to see that the intersection of all sets corresponding to properties that hold ‘with probability 1’ is empty. The Martin-Löf theory of randomness [Li and Vitányi 1997] essentially resolves this issue. Martin-Löf’s notion of randomness turns out to be, roughly, equivalent with Kolmogorov randomness: a sequence x is random if $K(x) \approx l(x)$, i.e. it cannot be effectively compressed. This theory allows us to speak of the randomness of single, individual sequences, which is inherently impossible for probabilistic theories. Yet, as shown by Martin-Löf, his notion of randomness is entirely consistent with probabilistic ideas. Identifying the randomness of an individual sequence with its incompressibility opens up a whole new area, which is illustrated by Example 21, in which we made distinctions between different *types* of random sequences (‘positive’ and ‘negative’) that cannot be expressed in, let alone understood from, a traditional probabilistic perspective.

Philosophy of Statistics/Inductive Inference: Epistemological Occam’s Razor There exist two close connections between algorithmic information theory and inductive inference: one via the algorithmic sufficient statistic and the MDL Principle; the other via Solomonoff’s induction theory, which there was no space to discuss here [Li and Vitányi 1997]. The former deals with finding structure in data; the latter is concerned with sequential prediction. Both of these theories implicitly employ a form of Occam’s Razor: when two hypotheses fit the data equally well, they prefer the simplest one (with the shortest description). Both the MDL and the Solomonoff approach are theoretically quite well-behaved: there exist several convergence theorems for both approaches. Let us give an example of such a theorem for the MDL framework: Barron and Cover [1991] and Barron [1985] show that, if data are distributed according to some distribution in a contemplated model class (set of candidate distributions) \mathcal{M} , then two-part MDL will eventually find this distribution; it will even do so based on a

reasonably small sample. This holds both for practical versions of MDL (with restricted model classes) as well as for versions based on Kolmogorov complexity, where \mathcal{M} consists of the huge class of all distributions which can be arbitrarily well approximated by finite computer programs. Such theorems provide a justification for MDL. Looking at the proofs, one finds that the preference for simple models is crucial: the convergence occurs precisely because complexity of each probabilistic hypotheses P is measured by its codelength $L(P)$, under a some prefix-code that allows one to encode all P under consideration. If a complexity measure $L'(P)$ is used that does *not* correspond to any prefix code, then, as is easy to show, in some situations MDL will not converge at all, and, no matter how many data are observed, will keep selecting overly complex, suboptimal hypotheses for the data. In fact, even if the world is such that data are generated by a very complex (high $K(P)$) distribution, it is wise to prefer simple models at small sample sizes [Grünwald 2007]! This provides a justification for the use of MDL's version of Occam's razor in inductive inference. It should be stressed that this is an *epistemological* rather than a (*meta-*) *physical* form of Occam's Razor: it is used as an effective *strategy*, which is something very different from a belief that 'the true state of the world is likely to have a short description'. This issue, as well as the related question to what extent Occam's Razor can be made representation-independent, is discussed in great detail in [Grünwald 2007].

A further difference between statistical inference based on algorithmic information theory and almost all other approaches to statistics and learning is that the algorithmic approach focuses on individual data sequences: there is no need for the (often untenable) assumption of classical statistics that there is some distribution P according to which the data are distributed. In the Bayesian approach to statistics, probability is often interpreted subjectively, as a degree of belief. Still, in many Bayesian approaches there is an underlying assumption that there exists 'states of the world' which are viewed as probability distributions. Again, such assumptions need not be made in the present theories; neither in the form which explicitly uses Kolmogorov complexity, nor in the restricted practical form. In both cases, the goal is to find regular patterns in the data, no more. All this is discussed in detail in [Grünwald 2007].

Philosophy of Information On the first page of the chapter on Shannon information theory in this handbook [Harremoës and Topsøe 2007], we read "information is always *information about something*." This is certainly the case for Shannon information theory, where a string x is always used to communicate some state of the world, or of those aspects of the world that we care about. But if we identify 'amount of information in x ' with $K(x)$, then it is not so clear anymore what this 'information' is about. $K(x)$, the algorithmic information in x looks at the information in x itself, independently of anything outside. For example, if x consists of the first billion bits of the binary expansion of π , then its information content is the size of the smallest program which prints these bits. This sequence does not describe any state of the world that is to be communicated. Therefore, one may argue that it is meaningless to say that ' x carries information', let alone to measure its amount. At a workshop where many

of the contributors to this handbook were present, there was a long discussion about this question, with several participants insisting that “algorithmic information misses “aboutness” (sic), and is therefore not really information”. In the end the question whether algorithmic information should really count as “information” is, of course, a matter of definition. Nevertheless, we would like to argue that there exist situations where intuitively, the word “information” seems exactly the right word to describe what is being measured, while nevertheless, “aboutness” is missing. For example, $K(y|x)$ is supposed to describe the amount of “information” in y that is not already present in x . Now suppose y is equal to $3x$, expressed in binary, and x is a random string of length n , so that $K(x) \approx K(y) \approx n$. Then $K(y|x) = O(1)$ is much smaller than $K(x)$ or $K(y)$. The way an algorithmic information theorist would phrase this is “ x provides nearly all the *information* needed to generate y .” To us, this seems an eminently reasonable use of the word information. Still, this “information” does not refer to any outside state of the world.⁷

Let us assume then that the terminology “algorithmic *information* theory” is justified. What lessons can we draw from the theory for the philosophy of information?

First, we should emphasize that the amount of ‘absolute, inherent’ information in a sequence is only well-defined asymptotically and is in general uncomputable. If we want a nonasymptotic and efficiently computable measure, we are forced to use a restricted class of description methods. Such restrictions naturally lead one to universal coding and practical MDL. The resulting notion of information is always defined *relative* to a class of description methods and can make no claims to objectivity or absoluteness. Interestingly though, unlike Shannon’s notion, it is still meaningful for individual sequences of data, and is not dependent on any outside *probabilistic* assumptions: this is an aspect of the general theory that can be retained in the restricted forms [Grünwald 2007].

Second, the algorithmic theory allows us to formalize the notion of ‘meaningful information’ in a distinctly novel manner. It leads to a separation of the meaningful information from the noise in a sequence, once again without making any probabilistic assumptions. Since learning can be seen as an attempt to find the meaningful information in data, this connects the theory to inductive inference.

Third, the theory re-emphasizes the connection between measuring amounts of information and data compression, which was also the basis of Shannon’s theory. In fact, algorithmic information has close connections to Shannon information after all, and *if* the data x are generated by some probabilistic process P , so that the information in x is actually really ‘about’ something, then the algorithmic information in x behaves very similarly to the Shannon entropy of P , as explained in Section 5.3.

Further Reading Kolmogorov complexity has many applications which we could not discuss here. It has implications for aspects of physics such as the second law of

⁷We may of course say that x carries information “about” y . The point, however, is that y is not a state of any imagined external world, so here “about” does not refer to anything external. Thus, one cannot say that x contains information about some external state of the world.

thermodynamics; it provides a novel mathematical proof technique called the *incompressibility method*, and so on. These and many other topics in Kolmogorov complexity are thoroughly discussed and explained in the standard reference [Li and Vitányi 1997]. Additional (and more recent) material on the relation to Shannon’s theory can be found in Grünwald and Vitányi [2003, 2004]. Additional material on the structure function is in [Vereshchagin and Vitányi 2004; Vitányi 2005]; and additional material on MDL can be found in [Grünwald 2007].

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